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Abstract – This paper studies social optimal control of
mean field LQG (linear-quadratic-Gaussian) models with un-
certainty. Specially, the uncertainty is represented by a un-
certain drift which is common for all agents. A robust op-
timization approach is applied by assuming all agents treat
the uncertain drift as an adversarial player. In our model,
both dynamics and costs of agents are coupled by mean
field terms, and both finite- and infinite-time horizon cases
are considered. By examining social functional variation and
exploiting person-by-person optimality principle, we construct
an auxiliary control problem for the generic agent via a class
of forward-backward stochastic differential equation system.
By solving the auxiliary problem and constructing consistent
mean field approximation, a set of decentralized control strate-
gies is designed and shown to be asymptotically optimal.
Index Terms – Linear quadratic optimal control, mean
field control, model uncertainty, social functional variation,
forward-backward stochastic differential equation.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
Mean field games and control have drawn increasing at-
tention in many fields, including system control, applied
mathematics and economics [4], [6], [10]. The mean field
game involves a very large population of small interacting
players with the feature that while the influence of each one
is negligible, the impact of the overall population is significant.
By now, mean field games and control have been intensively
studied in the linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) framework
[16], [17], [22], [32], [27], and there is a large body of works
on nonlinear models [19], [21], [7]. Huang et al. designed
-Nash equilibrium strategies for LQG mean field games
with discount costs based on the proposed Nash certainty
equivalence (NCE) approach [16], [17]. The NCE approach
was then applied to the cases with long run average costs [22]
and with Markov jump parameters [33], respectively. Lasry
and Lions independently introduced the model of mean field
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games and studied the well-posedness problem of the limiting
partial differential equations [21]. For further literature, readers
are referred to [15], [33], [34] on mean field games with major
players in continuous- or discrete-time, [7] on probabilistic
analysis of mean field games, and [36] on the oblivious
equilibrium in dynamic games.
Besides noncooperative games, social optima in mean field
models have also drawn much attention. The social optimum
control refers to that all the players cooperate to optimize the
common social cost—the sum of individual costs, which is
usually regarded as a type of team decision problem [11].
Huang et al. considered social optima in mean field LQG
control, and provided an asymptotic team-optimal solution
[18]. Wang and Zhang investigated a mean field social op-
timal problem where a Markov jump parameter appears as a
common source of randomness [35]. Also, see [20] for social
optima in mixed games, [2] for team-optimal control with
finite population and partial information, and [24] for social
optima of static mean field games.
Mathematical models can only be approximations of the real
world. Actually, some parts of a model may be inexact. Thus,
it is worthwhile to study the mean field control with model
uncertainty [3]. The works [13], [14], [31] investigated the
mean field games and control with a global uncertainty term.
The “hard constraint” case (the disturbance is specified with
a bound) was considered in [13] under which the substantial
difficulty arises after the Lagrange multiplier is introduced.
Authors in [14], [31] adopted the “soft constraint” approach
([3], [5], [8]) by removing the bound of the disturbance
while the effort is penalized in the cost function. The works
[30], [27] considered the case that each agent is paired with
the local disturbance as an adversarial player, and provided
an -Nash equilibrium by tackling a Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs
equation combined with a fixed-point analysis.
B. Challenge and Contribution
This paper investigates mean field LQG social optimum
control with a common uncertain drift, where both dynamics
and costs of agents involve mean field coupled terms. To
address the model uncertainty, a minus quadratic penalty term
of drift is incorporated into the cost functional. There exist
some substantial challenges in studying the problem. First,
the socially optimal control with respect to drift uncertainty
is a high-dimensional optimization problem with indefinite
state weights. The corresponding convexity condition is very
hard to verify. Second, by social variational derivation, the
resulting limit system is governed by a controlled forward-
backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE). To design
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2decentralized strategies, we need to solve the auxiliary optimal
control problem subject to an FBSDE system. Meanwhile, the
asymptotic optimality analysis is different from the general
mean field LQG problems. Third, for the social optimum
problem in the infinite horizon, we are faced with tackle
infinite-horizon FBSDEs and the relevant optimal control
problems.
In this paper, the social optimum control for the robust mean
field LQG model is tackled by using stochastic maximum
principle [38], [39], [40]. For the finite-horizon problem, we
first obtain some low-dimensional convexity conditions and a
set of FBSDEs by analyzing the variation of the centralized
maximization cost to drift uncertainty. With the help of the
Riccati equation, we further obtain a feedback type of the
“worst-case” drift for the social optimum problem. Next, we
construct an auxiliary optimal control problem based on the
social variational derivation and the person-by-person optimal-
ity principle. By solving the auxiliary problem combined with
consistent mean field approximations, a set of decentralized
control laws is designed and further shown to be asymptot-
ically robust social optimal by perturbation analysis. Finally,
from asymptotic analysis to FBSDEs we design decentralized
strategies and show their robust optimality for the infinite-
horizon social optimum problem.
The main contributions of the paper are summarized as
follows. (i) Social optimum control is studied for mean field
models with a common uncertain drift, where coupled terms
are included in both costs and dynamics of agents. By FBSDE
and Riccati equation approaches we design a set of decen-
tralized feedback control laws. (ii) By examining the social
cost variation, we give low-dimensional convexity conditions
and asymptotic convexity analysis for robust social optimum
problems. (iii) From consistency requirements in mean field
approximations, a system of differential equations is derived.
The existence condition of solutions to consistency equations
is characterized by a Riccati equation, instead of a fixed-
point analysis. (iv) From the perturbation analysis to FBSDE,
the decentralized strategies are shown to have asymptotic
robust optimality. (v) By analyzing the asymptotic behavior
of FBSDE, decentralized strategies for the infinite-horizon
problem are designed and further shown be robust social
optimal.
C. Organization and Notation
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section
II, we consider the finite-horizon social optimization problem
with drift uncertainty. By variational analysis, the centralized
control with respect to drift uncertainty is obtained. Then
an auxiliary optimal control problem is constructed based on
person-by-person optimality. By solving this problem com-
bined with consistent mean field approximations, a set of
decentralized strategies is designed and further proved to be
robust social optimal. Section III tackles the infinite-horizon
social optimum problem. In Section IV, a numerical example
is provided to verify the result. Section V concludes the paper.
Notation: Suppose that (Ω,F , {Ft}0≤t≤T ,P) is a complete
filtered probability space. Throughout this paper, we denote by
⊗ the Kronecker product, Im m-dimensional identity matrix
(In abbreviated as I). We use ‖ · ‖ to denote the norm
of a Euclidean space, or the Frobenius norm for matrices.
For a symmetric matrix Q and a vector z, ‖z‖2Q = zTQz;
for two vectors x, y, 〈x, y〉 = xT y. For a matrix (vector)
M , MT denotes its transpose, M > 0 means that M is
positive definite. Let L2F (0, T ;Rk) denote the space of all Rk-
valued Ft-progressively measurable processes x(·) satisfying
E
∫ T
0
‖x(t)‖2dt < ∞, and L2F, ρ2 (0,∞;R
k) denote the space
of all Rk-valued Ft-progressively measurable processes x(·)
satisfying E
∫∞
0
e−ρt‖x(t)‖2dt < ∞. C([0, T ],Rk) is the
space of all Rk-valued functions defined on [0, T ] which are
continuous; Cρ/2([0,∞),Rk) is a subspace of C([0,∞),Rk)
which is given by {f | ∫∞
0
e−ρt‖f(t)‖2dt < ∞}. For conve-
nience of presentation, we use C (or C1, C2, . . .) to denote a
generic constant which may vary from place to place.
II. MEAN FIELD SOCIAL CONTROL OVER A FINITE
HORIZON
Consider a large population systems with N agents. The ith
agent evolves by the following stochastic differential equation:
dxi(t) =[Axi(t) +Bui(t) +Gx
(N)(t) + f(t)]dt
+ σdWi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (1)
where xi ∈ Rn and ui ∈ Rr are the state and the input of agent
i, respectively. x(N)(t) = 1N
∑N
j=1 xj(t). {Wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N}
are a sequence of mutually independent d-dimensional Brow-
nian motions. f ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rn) is an unknown disturbance,
which reflects the effect imposed to each agent by the eternal
environment. The cost function of agent i is given by
JFi (u) =
1
2
E
∫ T
0
{∥∥xi(t)− Γx(N)(t)− η∥∥2Q
+ ‖ui(t)‖2R1 − ‖f(t)‖2R2
}
dt
+
1
2
E‖xi(T )‖2H , (2)
where Q,R1, R2, H ∈ Rn×n are symmetric, Γ ∈ Rn×n and
η ∈ Rn. u = {u1, . . . , uN}. Take {Ft}0≤t≤T as the natural
filtration generated by the Nd-dimensional Brownian motion
(W1, · · · ,WN ). The decentralized control set is given by
UFi =
{
ui | ui(t) ∈ σ(xi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t),
E
∫ T
0
‖ui(t)‖2dt <∞
}
.
For comparison, define the centralized control set as
UFc =
{
ui| ui(t) ∈ σ(xi(0),Wi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t, 1 ≤ i ≤ N),
E
∫ T
0
‖ui(t)‖2dt <∞
}
.
Denote JFsoc(u) =
∑N
i=1 J
F
i (u). Let the social cost under the
worst-case disturbance be
Jwosoc(u) = sup
f∈UFc
JFsoc(u, f).
3Problem (PF): Seek a set of decentralized control laws
(uˆ1, · · · , uˆN ) to minimize the social cost under the worst-case
disturbance for System (1)-(2), i.e., infui∈UFi J
wo
soc(u).
Remark 2.1: Different from [14], [30], we assume the
disturbance f is a common stochastic process. f may stand for
the impact from tax, subsidy or natural disaster. In this case,
agents may be pessimistic to suppose the disturbance would
use the information of all the agents to play against them.
We make the following assumptions.
(A0) {xi(0)} are independent random variables with the
same mathematical expectation. xi(0) = xi0, Exi(0) =
x¯0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . There exists a constant C0 such that
max1≤i≤N E‖xi0‖2 < C0. Furthermore, {xi0, i = 1, ..., N}
and {Wi, i = 1, ..., N} are independent of each other.
(A1) Q ≥ 0, R1 > 0, R2 > 0, and H ≥ 0.
From now on, the time variable t might be suppressed if
necessary and no confusion occurs.
A. The Control Problem with Respect to Model Uncertainty
Let ui = uˇi ∈ UFc , i = 1, · · · , N be fixed. The optimal
control problem with respect to drift uncertainty is as follow:
(P1) maximizef∈UFc J
F
soc(uˇ, f).
Clearly, (P1) is equivalent to the following problem:
(P1′) minimizef∈UFc Jˇ
F
soc(f),
where
JˇFsoc(f) =
1
2
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
{
− ∥∥xi − Γx(N) − η∥∥2Q + ‖f‖2R2}dt
− 1
2
E‖xi(T )‖2H .
Let x = (xT1 , · · · , xTN )T , u = (uT1 , · · · , uTN )T , 1 =
(1, · · · , 1)T , W = (WT1 , · · · ,WTN )T , A = diag(A, · · · , A),
B = diag(B, · · · , B), σˆ = diag(σ, · · · , σ), H =
diag(H, · · · , H), Qˆ = diag{Q, · · · , Q}− 1N 11T⊗Ψ, and ηˆ =
1⊗ η¯, where Ψ ∆= ΓTQ+QΓ−ΓTQΓ and η¯ ∆= Qη−ΓTQη.
We can write Problem (P1′) as to minimize
JˇFsoc(f) =
1
2
E
∫ T
0
(
− xT Qˆx + 2ηˆT x +NfTR2f
)
dt
− 1
2
E[xT (T )Hx(T )],
subject to
dx(t) = Aˇx(t)dt+ Bu(t)dt+ 1⊗ f(t)dt+ σˆdW(t).
where Aˇ ∆= A + 1N (11
T ⊗G).
For the further existence analysis, we introduce the follow-
ing assumptions:
(A2) Problem (P1′) is convex in f ;
(A2′) Problem (P1′) is uniformly convex in f .
Below are some necessary and sufficient conditions to
ensure (A2) or (A2′).
Proposition 2.1: The following statements are equivalent:
(i) Problem (P1′) is convex in f .
(ii) For any f ∈ UFc ,∫ T
0
(
− yT Qˆy +NfTR2f
)
dt− ‖y(T )‖2H ≥ 0,
where y ∈ RnN satisfies
dy = (Aˇy + 1⊗ f)dt, y(0) = 0.
(iii) For any f ∈ UFc ,
E
∫ T
0
{
− ∥∥(I − Γ)yi∥∥2Q + ‖f‖2R2}dt− ‖yi(T )‖2H ≥ 0,
where for i = 1, 2, · · · , N , yi satisfies
dyi = [Ayi +Gy
(N) + f ]dt, yi(0) = 0. (3)
Proof. (i) ⇔ (ii) is given in [14], [23]. From (3), we have
y1 = y2 = · · · = yN = y(N). Thus,∫ T
0
(
− yT Qˆy +NfTR2f
)
dt− ‖y(T )‖2H
=
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
(
− ∥∥yi − Γyi∥∥2Q + ‖f‖2R2)dt− N∑
i=1
‖yi(T )‖2H
=N
[∫ T
0
(
− ∥∥(I−Γ)yi∥∥2Q+‖f‖2R2)dt−‖yi(T )‖2H],
(4)
which implies that (ii) is equivalent to (iii). 
Proposition 2.2: The following statements are equivalent:
(i) Problem (P1′) is uniformly convex in f .
(ii) There exists δ > 0 such that∫ T
0
(
− yT Qˆy +NfTR2f
)
dt− ‖y(T )‖2H ≥ δ
∫ T
0
‖f‖2dt.
(iii) The equation
P˙ + AˇTP + PAˇ− Qˆ− P(1⊗ I)(NR2)−1(1T ⊗ I)P = 0,
with P(T ) = −H admits a solution in C([0, T ];RnN ).
(iv) The following equation admits a solution in
C([0, T ];Rn),
P˙ + (A+G)TP + P (A+G)− PR−12 P
− (I − Γ)TQ(I − Γ) = 0, P (T ) = −H.
(v) For any t ∈ [0, T ], det[(0, I)eAt(0, I)T ] > 0, where
A =
 A+G+R−12 H −R−12
A21 −(A+G+R−12 H)T

with A21 = HR−12 H+(I−Γ)TQ(I−Γ)+(A+G)TH+H(A+G).
Proof. (i)⇔(ii) is implied from [14], [23]. (i)⇔(iii) is given
by Theorem 4.5 of [28]. By (4) and (ii), we have
E
∫ T
0
{−‖yi‖2Q(I−Γ)+‖f‖2R2}dt−‖yi(T )‖2H ≥ δN E
∫ T
0
‖f‖2dt.
By [28, Theorem 4.5], we obtain (ii)⇔(iv), which further
implies (i)⇔(iv). (iv)⇔(v) is given by [14], [25]. 
By examining the variation of JˇFsoc, we first obtain the nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for the existence of centralized
optimal control of (P1).
4Theorem 2.1: (P1′) has a minimizer in UFc if and only if
(A2) holds and the following equation system admits a set of
adapted solutions (xi, pi, i = 1, · · · , N):

dxˇi =(Axˇi +Buˇi +Gxˇ
(N)−R−12 pˇ(N)j )dt+σdWi,
dpˇi =− [AT pˇi +GT pˇ(N)j −Qxˇi + Ψxˇ(N) + η¯]dt
+
N∑
j=1
βji dWj ,
xˇi(0) = xi0, pˇi(T ) = −Hxˇi(T ), 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
(5)
where p(N) = 1N
∑N
j=1 pj , and furthermore the minimizer is
fˇ = −R−12 p(N).
Proof. Suppose that fˇ = −R−12 p(N), where pi, i =
1, · · · , N are a set of solutions to the equation system
dpi = αidt+ β
i
idWi +
∑
j 6=i
βji dWj , pi(T ) = −Hxi(T ), (6)
where i = 1, · · · , N ; αi and βji are to be determined. Denote
by xˇi the state of agent i under the control uˇi and the drift fˇ .
For any f ∈ UFc and ε ∈ R, let fε = fˇ + εf . Let xεi be the
solution of the following perturbed state equation
dxεi =
(
Axεi +Buˇi + fˇ + εf +
G
N
N∑
i=1
xεi
)
dt+ σdWi,
with xεi (0) = xi0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N .
Let yi = (xεi − xˇi)/ε, and y(N) =
∑N
i=1 yi/N . It can be
verified that yi satisfies (3). Then, by Itoˆ’s formula,
− E〈Hxˇi(T ), yi(T )〉
=E[〈pi(T ), yi(T )〉 − 〈pi(0), yi(0)〉]
=E
∫ T
0
[〈αi, yi〉+ 〈pi, Ayi +Gy(N) + f〉]dt. (7)
We have
JˇFsoc(fˇ + εf)− JˇFsoc(fˇ) = εΛ1 +
ε2
2
Λ2 (8)
where
Λ1
∆
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
[〈−Q(xˇi−(Γxˇ(N)+η)), yi−Γy(N)〉
+ 〈R2fˇ , f〉
]
dt−
N∑
i=1
E〈Hxˇi(T ), yi(T )〉,
Λ2
∆
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
{
− ∥∥yi − Γy(N)∥∥2Q + ‖f‖2R2}dt.
Note that
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
〈−Q(xˇi − (Γxˇ(N) + η)),Γy(N)〉dt
=E
∫ T
0
〈−ΓTQ N∑
i=1
(
xˇi − (Γxˇ(N) + η)
)
,
1
N
N∑
j=1
yj
〉
dt
=
N∑
j=1
E
∫ T
0
〈− ΓTQ
N
N∑
i=1
(
xˇi − (Γxˇ(N) + η)
)
, yj
〉
dt
=
N∑
j=1
E
∫ T
0
〈− ΓTQ((I − Γ)xˇ(N) − η), yj〉dt.
From (7), one can obtain that
Λ1 =E
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
[〈−Q(xˇi − (Γxˇ(N) + η)),
yi − Γy(N)
〉
+ 〈R2fˇ , f〉
]
dt
+
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
[〈αi, yi〉+ 〈pi, Ayi +Gy(N) + f〉]dt
=E
∫ T
0
〈
NR2fˇ +
N∑
i=1
pi, f
〉
dt
+
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
〈
−Q(xˇi − (Γxˇ(N) + η))+AT pi
+ΓTQ
(
(I − Γ)xˇ(N) − η)+ αi +GT p(N), yi〉dt,
From (8), fˇ is a minimizer to Problem (P1′) if and only if
Λ2 ≥ 0 and Λ1 = 0. By Proposition 2.1, Λ2 ≥ 0 if and only
if (A2) holds. Λ1 = 0 is equivalent to
αi =−
[
AT pi +G
T p(N) + ΓTQ
(
(I − Γ)xˇ(N) − η)
−Q(xˇi − (Γxˇ(N) + η))],
fˇ =−R−12 p(N).
Thus, we have the optimality system (5). Namely, Λ1 = 0 if
and only if (5) admits a solution (xˇi, pˇi, i = 1, · · · , N). 
Let uˇ(N) = 1N
∑N
i=1 uˇi, and pˇ
(N) = 1N
∑N
i=1 pˇi. It follows
from (5) that
dxˇ(N) =
(
(A+G)xˇ(N) +Buˇ(N) −R−12 pˇ(N)
)
dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
σdWi,
dpˇ(N) =−
[
(A+G)T pˇ(N) + (Ψ−Q)xˇ(N) + η¯
]
dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
βji dWj ,
xˇ(N)(0) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi0, pˇ
(N)(T ) = −Hxˇ(N)(T ).
(9)
Proposition 2.3: The FBSDE (5) admits a set of adapted
solutions (xi, pi, i = 1, · · · , N) if and only if (9) admits an
adapted solution (x(N), p(N)).
5Proof. If (9) admits an adapted solution (x(N), p(N)), then (5)
is decoupled. The existence of a set of solutions to (5) follows.
The part of necessity is straightforward. 
We further discuss the optimal feedback control of (P1′).
Let pˇ(N)(t) = P (t)xˇ(N)(t) + sˇ(t), t ≥ 0, where P ∈ Rn×n
and sˇ ∈ Rn. Then by (9) we have
dpˇ(N) =P
[
(A+G)xˇ(N) +Buˇ(N) −R−12 pˇ(N))dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
σdWi
]
+ P˙ xˇ(N)dt+ dsˇ
=−
[
(A+G)T (Pxˇ(N) + sˇ) + (Ψ−Q)xˇ(N)
+ η¯
]
dt+
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
βji dWj .
This implies
P˙ + (A+G)TP + P (A+G)− PR−12 P
− (I − Γ)TQ(I − Γ) = 0, P (T ) = −H, (10)
dsˇ+
[
(A+ G¯)T sˇ+ PBuˇ(N) + η¯
]
dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
( σ
N
− βji
)
dWj = 0, sˇ(T ) = 0, (11)
where G¯ ∆= G−R−12 P .
By the local Lipschitz continuous property of the quadratic
(matrix) function, (10) must admit a unique local solution
in a small time duration [T0, T ]. The global existence of the
solution for t ∈ [−∞, T ] or [0, T ] can be referred to [9], [1].
From Proposition 2.2, we obtain that under (A2′), (10) has a
unique solution in C([0, T ],Rn×n).
Theorem 2.2: Under (A0), (A1), (A2′), Problem (P1′) has
a minimizer
fˇ(t) = −R−12 [P (t)xˇ(N)(t) + sˇ(t)], t ≥ 0, (12)
where P and sˇ are solutions of (10) and (11), respectively.
Proof. Under (A2′), (10) admits a unique solution P , which
implies (11) has a unique solution sˇ in C([0, T ],Rn). By [25,
Theorem 2.4.1], (9) admits a unique solution (xˇ(N), pˇ(N)),
where pˇ(N) = Pxˇ(N)+sˇ. From Proposition 2.3, (5) is solvable.
This with Theorem 2.1 completes the proof. 
Remark 2.2: From the above analysis, (A2′) is sufficient for
solvability of FBSDE (5). Indeed, from [25], (A2′) is also a
necessary condition to ensure that the solvability of (5) holds
for any uˇi ∈ UFc .
B. Distributed Strategy Design
After the “worst-case” drift fˇ is applied, we have the
following optimal control problem.
(P2): Minimize JFsoc(u, fˇ(u)) over {ui ∈ UFc , i =
1, · · · , N}, where
dxi =[Axi +Bui +Gx
(N)−R−12 (Px(N) + s)]dt
+ σdWi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (13)
ds =− [(A+ G¯)T s+ PBu(N) + η¯]dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(βji −
σ
N
)dWj , s(T ) = 0. (14)
JFsoc(u) =
1
2
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
{∥∥xi − Γx(N) − η∥∥2Q + ‖ui‖2R1
−‖Px(N) + s‖2
R−12
}
dt+
1
2
E‖xi(T )‖2H . (15)
We first show that Problem (P2) has the property of uni-
formly convexity under certain conditions.
Lemma 2.1: Assume that A0), A1), A2′) hold. There exists
a sufficiently large C0 > 0 with R1 > C0I and R2 > C0I
such that Problem (P2) is uniformly convex in u.
Proof. Denote Q¯ = diag{Q, · · · , Q}− 1N 11T⊗(Ψ+PR−12 P ),
R1 = diag{R1, · · · , R1}, A¯ = diag{A, · · · , A} + 1N 11T ⊗
(G−R−12 P ). By a similar argument with [23], we obtain that
Problem (P2) is uniformly convex if for any ui ∈ UFc ,
E
∫ T
0
(
zT Q¯z + uTR1u−Ns`TR−12 s`
)
dt
+ E‖z(T )‖2H ≥ δE
∫ T
0
‖u‖2dt
where z ∈ RnN and s` ∈ Rn satisfy
dz =(A¯z + Bu− 1⊗R−12 s`)dt, z(0) = 0, (16)
ds` =− [(A+ G¯)T s`+ 1
N
PB(1T ⊗ I)u]dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
β`ji dWj , s`(T ) = 0. (17)
By [38, Chapter 7] and (17),
E
∫ T
0
‖s`(t)‖2dt ≤ C1
N2
E
∫ T
0
‖1T ⊗ I‖2‖u(t)‖2dt
≤C1
N
E
∫ T
0
‖u(t)‖2dt. (18)
This with (16) leads to E
∫ T
0
‖z‖2dt ≤ C2
∫ T
0
E‖u‖2dt. Note
that
λmin(Q¯) ≥λmin(Q)− [λmax(Ψ)+λmax(PR−12 P )]
≥− [λmax(Ψ) + λmax(PR−12 P )],
where λmin(Q) and λmax(Q) are smallest and largest eigen-
values of Q, respectively. From this with (18), there exists
δ > 0 and C0 > 0 such that for R1 > C0I and R2 > C0I ,
E
∫ T
0
(
zT Q¯z+uTR1u−Ns`TR−12 s`
)
dt+ E‖z(T )‖2H
≥ E
∫ T
0
[
uT (R1 − C0InN )u
]
dt ≥ δE
∫ T
0
(uTu)dt.

61) The Social Variational Derivation: Note that the social
optimum implies the person-by-person optimality [11]. If the
social cost is convex, then the socially optimal solution exists
and coincides with the person-by-person optimal solution [35].
We now provide a transformation of the original social opti-
mum problem by variational derivation and person-by-person
optimality. Suppose that uˆ = (uˆ1, · · · , uˆN ) is a minimizer
to Problem (P2), where uˆj ∈ UFc . Let xˆj correspond to uˆj ,
j = 1, · · · , N and xˆ(N) = 1N
∑N
j=1 xˆj . Let sˆ correspond to
uˆ1, · · · , uˆN . Fix uˆ−i = (uˆ1, · · · , uˆi−1, uˆi+1, · · · , uˆN ), and
perturb ui. Denote δui = ui − uˆi, δxj = xj − xˆj , δx(N) =
1
N
∑N
j=1 δxj and δs = s − sˆ. Let the strategy variation δui
be adapted to Ft and satisfy E
∫ T
0
‖δui‖2dt <∞. Let δJi be
the variation of Ji with respect to δui. By (13) and (14),
dδxj
dt
=Aδxj +
G¯
N
δxi +
G¯
N
∑
k 6=i
δxk −R−12 δs,
j 6= i, δxj(0) = 0,
dδs =− [(A+ G¯)T δs+ 1
N
PBδui
]
dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
δβji dWj , δs(T ) = 0. (19)
where G¯ ∆= G − R−12 P . This implies δxj = δxk, for any
j, k 6= i. Thus,
dδxj
dt
=(A+
N − 1
N
G¯)δxj +
G¯
N
δxi−R−12 δs, δxj(0)=0,
which gives that
δxj(t)=
∫ t
0
e(A+
N−1
N G¯)(t−τ)
( G¯
N
δxi(τ)−R−12 δs(τ)
)
dτ.
We further have
δx(N)(t) =
1
N
δxi(t) +
N − 1
N
∫ t
0
e(A+
N−1
N G¯)(t−τ)
×
( G¯
N
δxi(τ)−R−12 δs(τ)
)
dτ.
By this with (14), one can obtain
δJi(u, fˇ) =E
∫ T
0
{
[xˆi − Γxˆ(N) − η]TQ
[
δxi − Γδx(N)
]
− (Pxˆ(N) + s)TR−12 (Pδx(N) + δs)
+ uˆTi R1δui
}
dt+ E[xTi (T )Hδxi(T )],
and for j 6= i,
δJj(u, fˇ)
=E
∫ T
0
[
(xˆj − Γxˆ(N) − η)TQ(δxj − Γδx(N))
− (Pxˆ(N) + s)TR−12 (Pδx(N) + δs)
]
dt
+ E[xTj (T )Hδxj(T )].
The above equation further implies that∑
j 6=i
δJj(u, fˇ)
=E
∫ T
0
(
xˆ
(N)
−i − N−1N (Γxˆ(N) + η)
)T
Q
[
(I − N−1N Γ)
·
∫ t
0
e(A+
N−1
N G¯)(t−τ)(G¯δxi −NR−12 δs)dτ − Γδxi
]
− (Pxˆ(N) + s)TR−12
[
P
( (N−1)2
N2
∫ t
0
e(A+
N−1
N G¯)(t−s)
· G¯δxids+N−1N δxi
)
+(N − 1)δs
]
dt+ E
[
x
(N)
−i (T )
T
·H
∫ T
0
e(A+
N−1
N G¯)(T−t)(G¯δxi −NR−12 δs)dt
]
,
where xˆ(N)−i =
1
N
∑
j 6=i xˆj . Let δψi = Nδs. Then from (19),
dδψi =−
[
(A+ G¯)T δψi + PBδui
]
dt
+
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
δβji dWj , δψi(T ) = 0. (20)
For large N , it is plausible to approximate xˆ(N) by a deter-
ministic function x¯. The zero first-order variational condition
combined with the mean field approximation gives
E
∫ T
0
{
(xˆi − Γx¯− η)TQδxi −
[
((I − Γ)x¯− η)TQΓ
+ (Px¯+ s¯)TR−12 P
]
δxi +
[
((I − Γ)x¯− η)TQ(I − Γ)
−(Px¯+s¯)TR−12 P
]∫ t
0
e(A+G¯)(t−τ)(G¯δxi−R−12 δψi)dτ
− (Px¯+ s¯)TR−12 δψi + uˆTi R1δui
+ x¯T (T )He(A+G¯)(T−t)(G¯δxi −R−12 δψi)
}
dt
+ E[xTi (T )Hδxi(T )] = 0, (21)
where x¯ ∈ C([0, T ],Rn) is an approximation of xˆ(N). From
observation, the equation (21) is the zero variation condition
for the optimal control problem with the cost function:
J ′i(ui)
=
1
2
E
∫ T
0
{
xTi Qxi + 2
[− ((I − Γ)x¯− η)T QΓ
− (Γx¯+ η)TQ− (Px¯+ s¯)TR−12 P
]
xi
+ 2
[
((I − Γ)x¯− η)TQ(I − Γ)− (Px¯+ s¯)TR−12 P
]
×
∫ t
0
e(A+G¯)(t−τ)(G¯xi −R−12 ψi)dτ
+ x¯T (T )He(A+G¯)(T−t)(G¯xi −R−12 ψi)
+ uTi R1ui
}
dt+
1
2
E[xTi (T )Hxi(T )]
=
1
2
E
∫ T
0
{
xTi Qxi − 2
[
Ψx¯+ η¯ + (Px¯+ s¯)TR−12 P
]
xi
+ 2vT (G¯xi −R−12 ψi) + uTi R1ui
}
dt
+
1
2
E[xTi (T )Hxi(T )], (22)
7where the second equality holds by an exchange of order of
the integration, and
v(t)
∆
=
∫ T
t
e(A+G¯)
T (τ−t)[(I − Γ)TQ((I − Γ)x¯− η)
− PR−12 (Px¯+ s¯)
]
dτ + e(A+G¯)
T (T−t)Hx¯(T ).
2) Mean field approximation: Based on (13), (20) and (22),
we construct the following auxiliary optimal control problem.
(P3): minimize J¯i(ui) over ui ∈ Ui, where
dx`i =[Ax`i +Bui +Gx¯−R−12 (Px¯+ s¯)]dt
+ σdWi, x`i(0) = xi0, (23)
dψi =−
[
(A+ G¯)Tψi + PBui
]
dt
+ ziidWi, ψi(T ) = 0. (24)
J¯i(ui) =
1
2
E
∫ T
0
[
x`Ti Qx`i − 2(Px¯+ s¯)TR−12 Px`i
− 2(Ψx¯+ η¯)T x`i + 2vT (G¯x`i −R−12 ψi)
− 2(Px¯+ s¯)TR−12 ψi + uTi R1ui
]
dt
+
1
2
E[x`Ti (T )Hx`i(T )]. (25)
Here s¯, v are determined by
˙¯s = −(A+G−R−12 P )T s¯− PBu¯− η¯, s¯(T ) = 0, (26)
v˙ = −(A+ G¯)T v − [(I − Γ)TQ((I − Γ)x¯− η)
− PR−12 (Px¯+ s¯)
]
, v(T ) = Hx¯(T ), (27)
and x¯, u¯ ∈ C([0, T ],Rn) are given for approximations to
xˆ(N), uˆ(N), respectively.
Theorem 2.3: Assume that (A0)-(A1), (A2′) hold. Problem
(P3) has a unique optimal control
uˆi(t) = −R−11 BT [ki(t)− P (t)l(t)], 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (28)
where (l, ki, ζi) is a unique adaptive solution to the following
(decoupled) FBSDE
dl =[(A+ G¯)l +R−12 v +R
−1
2 (Px¯+ s¯)]dt, l(0) = 0, (29)
dki =−
{
AT ki +Qx`i − (Ψx¯+ η¯)− PR−12 (Px¯+ s¯)
+ G¯T v
}
dt+ ζidWi, ki(T ) = Hx`i(T ). (30)
Proof. Since Q ≥ 0 and R1 > 0, then from [23], [14], (P3)
is uniformly convex in ui and there exists a unique optimal
control for (P3), denoted as uˆi. Then
0 =δJ¯i(uˆi)
=E
∫ T
0
[
(Qx`i−Ψx¯−η¯)T δx`i − (Px¯+ s¯)TR−12 Pδx`i
+ vT (G¯δx`i −R−12 ψi)− (Px¯+ s¯)R−12 ψi
+ uTi R1δui
]
dt+ E[x`Ti (T )Hδx`i(T )], (31)
where δui = ui− uˆi, δx`i = x`i− xˆi, and δψi = ψi− ψˆi. Note
that (29) and (30) are decoupled. Given x¯, u¯ ∈ C([0, T ],Rn),
(29) is a standard linear BSDE and so has a unique solution
(ki, ζi). Note that
d(δx`i) =(Aδx`i +Bδui)dt,
d(δψi) =−
[
(A+ G¯)T δψi + PBδui
]
dt
+
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
δβji dWj , δψi(T ) = 0.
By Itoˆ’s formula, we have
E[x`Ti (T )Hδx`i(T )]
=E[kTi (T )δx`i(T )− kTi (0)δx`i(0)]
=E
∫ T
0
{
− [Qx`i − (Ψx¯+ η¯)
− PR−12 (Px¯+ s¯) + G¯T v
]T
δx`i + k
T
i Bδui
}
dt,
and
E[lT (T )δψi(T )− lT (0)δψi(0)]
=E
∫ T
0
[
(R−12 v +R
−1
2 (Px¯+ s¯))
T δψi−lTPBδui
]
dt.
This and (31) gives
0 = E
∫ T
0
(R1ui +B
T ki −BTPl)T δuidt,
which implies uˆi = R−11 B
T (Pl − ki), 1 ≤ i ≤ N . 
Let ki = Kx`i + ϕ. Then by (23) and (29),
dki =K(Ax`i −BR−11 BT (Kx`i − Pl + ϕ) +Gx¯
−R−12 (Px¯+ s¯))dt+KσdWi + K˙x`i + ϕ˙
=−
{
AT (Kx`i + ϕ) +Qx`i − (Ψx¯+ η¯)
− PR−12 (Px¯+ s¯) + G¯T v
}
+ ζidWi,
which implies
K˙ +ATK +KA−KBR−11 BTK +Q = 0,
K(T ) = H, (32)
ϕ˙+ (A−BR−11 BTK)Tϕ+KBR1BTPl
+KG¯x¯−KR−12 s¯− (Ψx¯+ η¯)
− PR−12 (Px¯+ s¯) + G¯T v = 0, ϕ(T ) = 0. (33)
Besides, applying (28) into (23), we obtain
dxˆ(N) =[Axˆ(N) −BR−11 BT (Kxˆ(N) − Pl + ϕ)
+ G¯x¯−R−12 s¯]dt+
1
N
N∑
i=1
σdWi,
where xˆ(N)(0) = 1N
∑N
i=1 xi0. As an approximation, one can
obtain
˙¯x =(A¯+G¯)x¯+BR−11 B
T (Pl−ϕ)−R−12 s¯, x¯(0) = x¯0, (34)
where A¯ ∆= A−BR−11 BTK.
8By (34), (25), (27), and (33),
˙¯x =(A¯+ G¯)x¯+BR−11 B
T (Pl − ϕ)
−R−12 s¯, x¯(0) = x¯0,
l˙ =(A+ G¯)l +R−12 v +R
−1
2 (Px¯+ s¯), l(0) = 0,
˙¯s =− (A+ G¯)T s¯+ PBR−11 BT (Kx¯− Pl + ϕ)
− η¯, s¯(T ) = 0,
ϕ˙ =− A¯Tϕ−KBR−11 BTPl −KG¯x¯+KR−12 s¯
+ Ψx¯+ η¯ + PR−12 (Px¯+ s¯)−G¯T v, ϕ(T ) = 0,
v˙ =− (A+ G¯)T v + (Ψ−Q)x¯+ η¯
+ PR−12 (Px¯+ s¯), v(T ) = Hx¯(T ).
(35)
For further analysis, we assume:
(A3) (35) admits a unique solution in C([0, T ],R5n).
Note that (35) can be taken as an FBSDE without diffusion
terms. The condition of contraction mapping in Theorem 5.1 of
[25] holds necessarily. Thus, (35) must admit a unique solution
in a small time duration [T0, T ]. However, some additional
conditions are needed for existence of a (global) solution to
(35) in the time duration [0, T ]. We now give a sufficient
condition that ensures (A3).
Let
M11 =
[
A¯+ G¯ BR−11 B
TP
R−12 P A+ G¯
]
,
M12 =
[ −R−12 −BR−11 BT 0
R−12 0 R
−1
2
]
,
M21 =
 PBR−11 BTK −PBR−11 BTP−KG¯+ Ψ + PR−12 P 0
Ψ−Q+ PR−12 P 0
,
M22 =
 −(A+ G¯) PBR−11 BTK 0(K + P )R−12 −A¯ −G¯T
PR−12 0 −(A+ G¯)
.
Then (35) can be written as
˙¯x
l˙
s˙
ϕ˙
v˙
 =
[
M11 M12
M21 M22
]
x¯
l
s
ϕ
v
+

0
0
−η¯
η¯
η¯
 . (36)
Proposition 2.4: If the Riccati differential equation
Y˙ = M21 +M22Y − YM11 − YM12Y,
Y (T ) =
[
0 0 HT
0 0 0
]T
admits a solution Y ∈ R3n×2n in [0, T ], then (A3) holds.
Furthermore, under the assumption η¯ = 0, if the Riccati
differential equation
Z˙ = M12 +M11Z − ZM22 − ZM21Z,Z(0) = 0 (37)
admits a solution Z ∈ R2n×3n in [0, T ], then (A3) holds.
Proof. Denote m = [x¯T , lT ]T , and z = [sT , ϕT , vT ]T . Let
z = Y m + α, α(T ) = 0. Then Y (T ) =
[
0 0 HT
0 0 0
]T
.
By (36),
z˙ =Y˙ m+ Y (M11m+M12z) + α˙
=(Y˙ + YM11 + YM12Y )x¯+ YM12α+ α˙
=M21x¯+M22(Y x¯+ α) + [−η¯T , η¯T , η¯T ]T .
Thus, we obtain
Y˙ =M21 +M22Y − YM11 − YM12Y, (38)
α˙ =(M22 − YM12)α+ [−η¯T , η¯T , η¯T ]T , (39)
where Y (T ) =
[
0 0 HT
0 0 0
]T
and α(T ) = 0. Since (38)
admits a solution, then (39) has a solution. Applying z =
Y m+ α into (36), we have
m˙ = M11m+M12(Y m+ α), m(0) = [x¯
T
0 , 0]
T ,
which implies (35) admits a unique solution in [0, T ].
Denote Z =
[
Z11 Z12 Z13
Z21 Z22 Z23
]
. Note that s(T ) =
ϕ(T ) = 0, and v(T ) = Hx¯(T ). We have 0 00 0
H 0
[ Z11 Z12 Z13
Z21 Z22 Z23
]
=
 0 0 00 0 0
HZ11(T ) HZ12(T ) HZ13(T )
 6= I3n.
By the modified Radon’s Lemma (see e.g., [1, Theorem
3.1.3]), the proposition follows. 
C. Asymptotic Optimality
For Problem (PF), we may design the following decentral-
ized control:
uˆi(t) = −R−11 BT [K(t)xi(t)− P (t)l(t) + ϕ(t)], (40)
where K,P are given by (32) and (10), respectively, and l
and ϕ are determined by (35). After the control laws (40) are
applied, we obtain the state equations of agents as follows:
dxˆi =[A¯xˆi + G¯xˆ
(N)+BR−11 B
T (Pl − ϕ)−R−12 sˆ]dt
+ σdWi, i = 1, · · · , N. (41)
dsˆ =− [(A+ G¯)T sˆ+ PBuˆ(N) + η¯]dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(βji −
σ
N
)dWj , sˆ(T ) = 0. (42)
For further analysis, we assume
(A4) The Riccati equation admits a solution:
˙˜P + P˜ (A¯+ G¯) + (A+ G¯)T P˜ − P˜R−12 P˜
+ PBR−11 B
TK = 0, P˜ (T ) = 0.
Lemma 2.2: Assume that (A0)-(A1), (A2′), (A3)-(A4) hold.
For the system (1)-(2), we have
sup
0≤t≤T
E
(‖xˆ(N) − x¯‖2 + ‖sˆ− s¯‖2) = O(1/N). (43)
9Proof. It follows by (41) and (42) that
dxˆ(N) =[(A¯+ G¯)xˆ(N) +BR−11 B
T (Pl − ϕ)
−R−12 sˆ]dt+
1
N
N∑
i=1
σdWi,
dsˆ =(A+ G¯)T sˆ+ PBuˆ(N) + η¯
]
dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(βji −
σ
N
)dWj , sˆ(T ) = 0.
Denote ξ ∆= xˆ(N) − x¯ and χ ∆= sˆ − s¯. From the above two
equations and (35),
dξ =(A¯+ G¯)ξdt−R−12 χdt+
1
N
N∑
i=1
σdWi,
ξ(0) = 1N
∑N
i=1 xi0 − x¯0, (44)
dχ =− [(A+ G¯)Tχ+ PBR−11 BTKξ]dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(βji −
σ
N
)dWj , χ(T ) = 0. (45)
Let χ(t) = P˜ (t)ξ(t) + ψ(t), t ≥ 0. By Itoˆ formula,
dχ = ˙˜Pξ + P˜
{
[(A¯+ G¯)ξ −R−12 (P˜ ξ + ψ)]dt
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
σdWj
}
+ ψ˙
=− [(A+ G¯)T (P˜ ξ + ψ) + PBR−11 BTKξ]dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(βji −
σ
N
)dWj ,
which gives
∑N
i=1 β
j
i = (P˜ + I)σ, and
˙˜P + P˜ (A¯+ G¯) + (A+ G¯)T P˜ − P˜R−12 P˜
+ PBR−11 B
TK = 0, P˜ (T ) = 0,
ψ˙ + (A+ G¯−R−12 P˜ )Tψ = 0, ψ(T ) = 0.
From (A4), we have P˜ is existent and ψ(t) ≡ 0. Thus,
ξ(t) =eΥtξ(0) +
1
N
∫ t
0
eΥ(t−µ)
N∑
i=1
σdWi(µ),
where Υ = A¯+ G¯−R−12 P˜ . By (A0), one can obtain
E‖ξ(t)‖2 ≤ 2
N
∥∥eΥt∥∥2{ max
1≤i≤N
E‖xi0‖2+
∫ t
0
∥∥e−Υµσ∥∥2dµ},
which completes the proof. 
Lemma 2.3: If u = (u1, · · · , uN ) satisfies
sup
f∈UFc
J (N)soc (u) ≤ C,
then there exists C1 independent of N such that
E
∫ T
0
‖ui‖2dt ≤ C1 for all i = 1, · · · , N .
Proof. Let f = 0. Since R1 > 0, then supf J
(N)
soc (u) ≤ C
implies E
∫ T
0
‖ui‖2dt ≤ C1 for all i = 1, · · · , N . 
Lemma 2.4: Assume that (A0)-(A1), (A2′), (A3)-(A4) hold.
Then there exists a constant C0 independent of N such that
sup
f∈UFc
N∑
i=1
Ji(uˆ, f) ≤ NC0.
Proof. Under (A0), (A1) and (A2′), fˇ = −R−12 (Pxˇ(N) +
s) is a maximizer of
∑N
i=1 Ji(uˆ, f), i.e.,
∑N
i=1 Ji(uˆ, fˇ) =
supf
∑N
i=1 Ji(uˆ, f). By Lemma 2.2, we obtain
sup
0≤t≤T
E‖xˆ(N)‖2 sup
0≤t≤T
(
2E‖xˆ(N) − x¯‖2 + 2‖x¯‖2) ≤ C,
sup
0≤t≤T
E‖s(t)‖2 ≤ sup
0≤t≤T
(
2E‖s¯‖2 + 2E‖s− s¯‖2) ≤ C.
Denote g ∆= G¯xˆ(N) + BR−11 B
T (Pl − ϕ) − R−12 s. Note that
l, ϕ ∈ C([0, T ],Rn). Then we have sup0≤t≤T E‖g(t)‖2 ≤ C.
It follows from (41) that
E‖xˆi‖2 ≤C + 3C
∥∥∥E∫ T
0
eA¯(T−τ)dτ
∥∥∥2
+ 3E
∫ T
0
∥∥∥eA¯(T−τ)σ∥∥∥2dτ.
From this with (40), we have
N∑
i=1
sup
f
Ji(uˆ, f) =
1
2
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
{∥∥xˆi − Γxˆ(N) − η∥∥2Q
+ ‖uˆi‖2R1 − ‖fˇ‖2R2
}
dt ≤ NC0.

Let kˆi
∆
= Kxˆi + ϕ, where ϕ is given by (35). We have the
following approximation result.
Lemma 2.5: Assume that (A0)-(A1), (A2′), (A3)-(A4) hold.
Then for problem (PF), we have
sup
0≤t≤T
E‖kˆ(N) − v‖2 = O(1/N),
where kˆ(N) = 1N
∑N
i=1 kˆi and v is given by (35).
Proof. Let ϑ = v − Kx¯ − ϕ. By (35) and some elementary
calculations, we obtain
dϑ(t) = −ATϑ(t)dt, ϑ(T ) = 0,
which implies ϑ(t) ≡ 0. This further gives v = Kx¯ + ϕ. By
Lemma 2.2, we have
sup
0≤t≤T
E‖kˆ(N) − v‖2 = sup
0≤t≤T
E‖K(xˆ(N) − x¯)‖2
≤ C sup
0≤t≤T
E‖xˆ(N) − x¯‖2 = O(1/N).
This completes the proof. 
We are in a position to state the result of asymptotic
optimality of the decentralized control.
Theorem 2.4: Let (A0)-(A1), (A2′), (A3)-(A4) hold. Assume
that (P2) is convex. For Problem (PF), the set of control laws
uˆ = (uˆ1, · · · , uˆN ) given by (40) has asymptotic robust social
optimality, i.e.,∣∣∣∣ 1N Jwosoc(uˆ)− 1N infu∈UFc Jwosoc(u)
∣∣∣∣ = O( 1√N ).
Proof. See Appendix A. 
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III. ROBUST MEAN FIELD SOCIAL CONTROL OVER AN
INFINITE HORIZON
In this section, we consider social optimum control in robust
mean field model over an infinite horizon. Let
Ui =
{
ui | ui(t) ∈ σ(xi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t),
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖xi(t)‖2dt <∞
}
,
and
Ji(u, f) =
1
2
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{∥∥xi(t)− Γx(N)(t)− η∥∥2Q
+‖ui(t)‖2R1 − ‖f(t)‖2R2
}
dt, (46)
where ρ ≥ 0.
Problem (PI): Seek a set of decentralized control to
optimize the social cost under the worst-case disturbance
for System (1) and (46), i.e., infui∈Ui supf∈Uc Jsoc, where
Jsoc(u, f) =
∑N
i=1 Ji(u, f), and
Uc =
{
ui| ui(t) ∈ Ft,E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖xi(t)‖2dt <∞
}
.
A. Decentralized Control Design
Let ui = uˇi ∈ Uc, i = 1, · · · , N be fixed. The optimal
control problem with respect to drift uncertainty is as follow:
(P4) minimizef∈Uc Jˇsoc(uˇ, f),
where
Jˇsoc(uˇ, f) =
1
2
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{
− ∥∥xi(t)− Γx(N)(t)
−η∥∥2
Q
+ ‖f(t)‖2R2
}
dt. (47)
An example of scalar model. Consider the case of uniform
agents with scalar states. Let A = a, η = 0, G = 0, Q =
1,Γ = γ, R2 = r2, xi ∈ R and uˇi = 0, i = 1, · · · , N . By
rearranging the integrand of Jsoc, we have
Jˇsoc =
1
2
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
− xT Qˆx+Nr2f2
)
dt,
where x = (x1, · · · , xN )T , and Qˆ = (qˆij) is given by
qˆii = 1 + (γ
2 − 2γ)/N, qˆij = (γ2 − 2γ)/N, i 6= j.
Introduce the Riccati equation
2(a− ρ
2
)P − 1
Nr2
P11TP − Qˆ = 0. (48)
By observation, P has the form pij =
{
p if i = j
q if i 6= j. Denote
a¯ = a − ρ2 . By solving (48), we obtain the maximal solution
as follows: p = q + 12a¯ and
q =
1
N
(
r2a¯− 1
2a¯
+
√
r22a¯
2 + r2(γ2 − 2γ − 1)
)
.
The optimal control is given by
fˇ =
1
Nr2
1TPx =
[
a¯+
√
a¯2+
1
r2
(γ2−2γ− 1)
]
x(N).

For general systems, we make the following assumptions:
(A5) Problem (P4) is uniformly convex in f ;
(A6) A+G− ρ2I is Hurwitz.
Below are some sufficient conditions to guarantee (A5).
Proposition 3.1:
Let (A6) hold. (P4) is uniformly convex in f , i.e., (A5)
holds, if and only if one of (i)-(iv) holds.
(i) For any f ∈ Uc, there exists δ > 0 such that
J ′soc(f) = E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
− yT Qˆy +NfTR2f
)
dt
≥ δE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖f‖2dt,
where y ∈ RnN satisfies
dy = (Aˇy + 1⊗ f)dt, y(0) = 0.
(ii) The equation
ρP = AˇTP + PAˇ− Qˆ− P(1⊗ I)(NR2)−1(1T ⊗ I)P
admits a solution such that Aˇ− (1⊗ I)(NR2)−1(1T ⊗ I)P−
ρ
2 (IN ⊗ I) is Hurwitz.
(iii) The equation
ρP =(A+G)TP + P (A+G)− PR−12 P + Ψ−Q
admits a solution such that A+ G¯− ρ2I is Hurwitz.
(iv) The real part of any eigenvalue of M is not zero, where
M =
[
A+G− ρ2I R−12−(I − Γ)TQ(I − Γ) −AT −GT + ρ2I
]
.
Proof. (A5)⇔(i) follows by Lemma 1 of [23]. We now prove
(ii)⇒(A5). If (ii) holds, then by the completion of squares
technique, we can obtain
J ′soc(f)
=E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtN
∥∥∥f(t) + 1
N
R−12 (1
T ⊗ I)Py(t)
∥∥∥2
R2
dt ≥ 0.
Clearly, J ′soc(f) = 0 leads to f(t) = − 1NR−12 (1T ⊗ I)Py(t),
which together with y(0) = 0 further implies f(t) ≡ 0. From
[14] we obtain that J ′soc(f) is positive definite, which implies
that (P4) is uniformly convex. Note that (Aˇ− ρ2 (IN⊗I)), IN⊗
I) is stabilizable. From (4) and (A5)⇔(i), (P4) is uniformly
convex if and only if there exists δ > 0 such that∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(−‖(I−Γ)yi‖2Q+fTR2f)dt ≥ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtδ‖f‖2dt.
Following the proof of (ii)⇒(A5), we obtain (iii)⇒(A5). Since
(A6) holds, it follows by [29] that (A5)⇒(iii). Note that (1T ⊗
I)Aˇ = 1T ⊗ (A+G), Aˇ(1⊗ I) = 1⊗ (A+G), and 1N (1T ⊗
I)Qˆ(1T ⊗ I) = Q−Ψ. We have 1N (1T ⊗ I)P(1T ⊗ I) = P.
From (3) and y1 = y2 = · · · = y(N), we obtain (iii)⇔(ii).
(iii)⇔(iv) is implied from [26]. 
Remark 3.1: From the proof of Proposition 3.1, Assumption
(A5) implies
J ′soc(f) = E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
− yT Qˆy +NfTR2f
)
dt ≥ 0,
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i.e., (P4) is convex in f .
With some abuse of notation, later we still use
P,K, Y, Z, s, s¯, ϕ, v · · · . But in this section P,K, Y, Z are
time-invariant and s, s¯, ϕ, v are functions of time t, t ∈ [0,∞).
Following (10)-(12), we may construct
fˇ = −R−12 (Px(N) + sˇ),
where P ∈ Rn×n and sˇ ∈ L2F, ρ2 (0,∞;R
n) are determined by
(A+G− ρ
2
I)TP + P (A+G− ρ
2
I)
− PR−12 P − (I − Γ)TQ(I − Γ) = 0, (49)
dsˇ+ [(A+G−R−12 P − ρI)T sˇ+ PBuˇ(N) + η¯]dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
ζidWi = 0. (50)
Theorem 3.1: Under (A1) and (A5), Problem (P4) has a
minimizer fˇ = −R−12 (Px(N) + sˇ), where P is the maximal
solution of (49) and sˇ is the unique solution of (50) in
L2F, ρ2 (0,∞;R
n).
Proof. Denote x´i = e−
ρ
2 txi, u´i = e−
ρ
2 tui and f´ = e−
ρ
2 tf . It
follows by (1) and (47) that
dx´i(t) =[(A− ρ
2
I)x´i(t)+Bu´i(t) +Gx´
(N)(t)+f´(t)]dt
+ e−
ρ
2 tσdWi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
Jˇsoc(uˇ, f) =
1
2
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
{
− ∥∥x´i(t)− Γx´(N)(t)
−e− ρ2 tη∥∥2
Q
+ ‖f´(t)‖2R2
}
dt.
By a similar argument in the proof of Theorem 2.1, we obtain
Jˇsoc(uˇ, f) = εΛ
′
1 +
ε2
2 Λ
′
2, where
Λ′1
∆
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
[〈−Q(x´i − (Γx´(N) + η)), y´i
− Γy´(N)〉+ 〈R2f´ , f´〉]dt,
Λ′2
∆
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
{
− ∥∥y´i − Γy´(N)∥∥2Q + ‖f´‖2R2}dt,
and y´i satisfies
dy´i =
[
(A− ρ
2
)y´i +Gy´
(N) + f´
]
dt, y´i(0) = 0.
By (A5), Λ′2 ≥ 0. Problem (P4) has a unique minimizer f´ =
−R−12 p´(N) if and only if
dx´i =
[
(A− ρ
2
I)x´i +Bu´i −R−12 p´(N) +Gx´(N)
]
dt
+ e−ρtσdWi, xi(0) = xi0,
dp´i =−
[
(A− ρ
2
I)T p´i +G
T p´(N) −Qx´i + Ψx´(N)
+ e−ρtη¯
]
dt+
N∑
j=1
β´ji dWj ,
(51)
admits a set of solutions (x´i, p´i, i = 1, · · · , N) in
L2F, ρ2 (0,∞;R
n). It follows from (51) that
dx´(N) =
[
(A+G− ρ
2
I)x´(N) +Bu´(N)
−R−12 p´(N)
]
dt+ e−ρtσdWi, xi(0) = xi0,
dp´(N) =− [(A+G− ρ
2
I)T p´(N) + (Ψ−Q)x´(N)
+ e−ρtη¯
]
dt+
N∑
j=1
β´ji dWj .
(52)
Note that A + G − ρ2I is Hurwitz. By (A5) and Proposition
3.1, we obtain that (49) admits a maximal solution such that
A+G− ρ2I−R−12 P is Hurwitz, which with [?, Theorem 3.3]
gives that (50) admits a unique solution in L2F, ρ2 (0,∞;R
n).
Let p´(N) = Px´(N) + s´, where s´ = e−
ρ
2 tsˇ. Then we have that
(x´(N), p´(N)) is a solution of (52). By a similar argument to
Theorem 2.2, the proof is completed. 
After the worst-case drift fˇ is applied, we have the following
optimal control problem.
(P2′): Minimize Jsoc(u, fˇ(u)) over {ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ N)|ui ∈
Uc}, where s ∈ L2F, ρ2 (0,∞;R
n),
dxi =[Axi+Bui +Gx
(N)−R−12 (Px(N) + s)]dt
+ σdWi, xi(0) = xi0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (53)
ds =− [(A+ G¯)T s+ PBu(N) + η¯]dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(βji −
σ
N
)dWj , (54)
Jsoc(u) =
1
2
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{∥∥xi − Γx(N) − η∥∥2Q
+ ‖ui‖2R1 − ‖Px(N) + s‖2R−12
}
dt. (55)
Lemma 3.1: Assume that A0), A5), A6) hold. Then there
exists C ′0 > 0 such that R1 > C
′
0I and R2 > C
′
0I , then
Problem (P2′) is uniformly convex.
Proof. Let z ∈ RnN and s` ∈ Rn satisfy
dz =(A¯z + Bu− 1⊗R−12 s`)dt, z(0) = 0, (56)
ds` =− [(A+ G¯)T s`+ 1
N
PB(1T ⊗ I)u]dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
β`ji dWj . (57)
By a similar argument with [23], we obtain that Problem (P2)
is uniformly convex if for any ui ∈ Uc, there exists δ > 0
such that
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
zT Q¯z + uTR1u−Ns`TR−12 s`
)
dt
≥δE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖u‖2dt. (58)
Note that A + G¯ − ρ2I is Hurwitz. By [29, Lemma 2.5] and
(57),
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖s´(t)‖2dt ≤ C1
N
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖u(t)‖2dt. (59)
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Since A¯− ρ2I is Hurwitz, then from (56) and (59), we obtain
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖z‖2dt ≤ C
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtE‖u‖2dt.
Note λmin(Q¯) ≥ −λmax(Ψ + PR−12 P ). Thus, there exists
C ′0 > 0 such that for R1 ≥ C ′0I and R2 ≥ C ′0I , (58) holds.

Based on the analysis in Section II-B, we construct an
auxiliary optimal control problem.
(P5): Minimize J¯i(ui) over ui ∈ Ui, where
dx`i=[Ax`i+Bui+Gx¯−R−12 (Px¯+s¯)]dt+ σdWi,
x`i(0) = xi0, (60)
dψi =−
[
(A+ G¯)Tψi + PBui
]
dt+ ziidWi
J¯i(ui) =
1
2
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
x`Ti Qx`i − 2(Ψx¯+ η¯)T x`i
− 2(Px¯+ s¯)TR−12 Px`i + 2vT (G¯x`i −R−12 ψi)
− 2(Px¯+ s¯)TR−12 ψi + uTi R1ui
]
dt. (61)
Here s¯, v ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) are determined by
˙¯s =− (A+ G¯− ρI)T s¯− PBu¯− η¯,
v˙ =− (A+ G¯− ρI)T v + (Ψ−Q)x¯+ η¯ + PR−12 (Px¯+ s).
By using the method in [38], [33], we can show that if (A6)
holds and Q ≥ 0, (P5) admits the unique optimal control
uˆi(t) = −R−11 BT (Kxi(t)− Pl(t) + ϕ(t)), (62)
where K ∈ Rn×n and l, ϕ ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) are determined
by
ρK =ATK +KA−KBR−11 BTK +Q,
l˙ =(A+ G¯)l +R−12 v +R
−1
2 (Px¯+ s¯), l(0) = 0,
ρϕ =ϕ˙+ A¯Tϕ+KBR−11 B
TPl +KG¯x¯
−KR−12 s¯− (Ψx¯+ η¯)−PR−12 (Px¯+ s¯) + G¯T v.
By applying the control (62) into (53) combined with mean
field approximations, we obtain the following equation system:
˙¯x =(A¯+G¯)x¯+BR−11 B
T(Pl−ϕ)−R−12 s¯, x¯(0) = x¯0,
l˙ =(A+ G¯)l +R−12 v +R
−1
2 (Px¯+ s¯), l(0) = 0,
˙¯s =−(A+ G¯−ρI)T s¯+ PBR−11 BT (Kx¯+ ϕ)−η¯,
ϕ˙=− (A¯−ρI)Tϕ−KBR−11 BTPl −KG¯x¯
+KR−12 s¯+ Ψx¯+ η¯ + PR
−1
2 (Px¯+ s¯)−G¯T v,
v˙ =− (A+ G¯− ρI)T v + (Ψ−Q)x¯+ η¯
+PR−12 (Px¯+ s¯).
(63)
For further analysis, we assume:
(A7) (63) admits a unique solution (x¯, l, s, ϕ, v) in
Cρ/2([0,∞),R5n).
The existence and uniqueness of a solution to (63) may be
obtained by using fixed-point methods similar to those in [17]
and [33]. We now give a sufficient condition that ensures (A7)
by virtue of Riccati equations. Using the notation in Section
II-B, we have
˙¯x
l˙
s˙
ϕ˙
v˙
 =
[
M11 M12
M21 M22 + ρI3n
]
x¯
l
s
ϕ
v
+

0
0
−η¯
η¯
η¯
. (64)
Proposition 3.2: If the algebraic Riccati equation
M21 + ρY +M22Y − YM11 − YM12Y = 0
admits a solution Y ∈ R3n×2n such that both M11 +M12Y −
ρ
2I2n and −M22+YM12− ρ2I3n are Hurwitz, then (A7) holds.
Proof. Denote m = [x¯T , lT ]T , z = [sT , ϕT , vT ]T . Let z =
Y m+ α. By (64) and Itoˆ’s formula, we obtain
Y˙ =M21 +M22Y − YM11 − YM12Y, (65)
α˙ =(M22 − YM12)α+ [−η¯T , η¯T , η¯T ]T . (66)
Since (65) admits a solution such that −M22 +YM12− ρ2I3n
is Hurwitz, then (66) has a unique solution
α(t) ≡−
∫ ∞
0
exp
[(−M22 + YM12 − ρ
2
I3n
)
τ
]
· [−η¯T , η¯T , η¯T ]T dτ.
Applying z = Y x¯+ α into (63), we have
m˙ = (M11 +M12Y )m+M12α.
Since M11 + M12Y − ρ2I2n is Hurwitz, then [x¯T , lT ]T ∈
Cρ/2([0,∞),R2n), and this further implies that (63) admits
a unique solution in Cρ/2([0,∞),R5n). 
B. Asymptotic Optimality
Let
uˆi(t) = −R−11 BT (Kxi(t)− Pl(t) + ϕ(t)), (67)
where l and ϕ are determined by (63). After the control uˆi is
applied, the closed-loop dynamics can be written as
dxˆi = [A¯xˆi + G¯xˆ
(N) +BR−11 B
T (Pl − ϕ)
−R−12 sˆ]dt+ σdWi.
(68)
For further analysis, we assume
(A8) The equation
P˜ (A¯+G¯)+(A+G¯)T P˜−P˜R−12 P˜+PBR−11 BTK = 0 (69)
admits a solution P˜ such that A¯+ G¯− ρ2I −R−12 P˜ and A+
G¯ − ρ2I − R−12 P˜ are Hurwitz, where A¯ = A − BR−11 BTK
and G¯ = G−R−12 P .
Theorem 3.2: Assume (i) (A0)-(A1), (A5)-(A8) hold, (ii)
A − ρ2I is Hurwitz (iii) (P2′) is convex. For Problem (PI),
the set of control laws uˆ = (uˆ1, · · · , uˆN ) given by (40) has
asymptotic robust social optimality, i.e.,∣∣∣∣∣ 1N supf∈Uc Jsoc(uˆ, f)− 1N infui∈Uc supf∈Uc Jsoc(u, f)
∣∣∣∣∣ = O( 1√N ).
Proof. See Appendix B. 
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IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We now give a numerical example for Problem (PF) to
verify the result. Take the parameters A = B = R1 = R2 =
Q = H = 1, G = −1.5, Γ = 0.5, η = 0, and T = 1. By
solving (10), we can obtain that P (t) = − 1(t+1) − 12 , which
is shown in Fig. 1. By Proposition 2.2, (A2′) holds. For (37)
in Proposition 2.4, the curves of all entries of the solution Z
are given in Fig. 2. It can be seen that when t ∈ [0, 0.7], (37)
admits a solution. By Matlab computation, the solution blows
up at t = 0.758276. From Proposition 2.4, when t ∈ [0, 0.7],
(A3) holds. The curve of P˜ is shown in Fig. 3. It can seen that
the Riccati equation in (A4) adimits a solution P˜ when t ∈
[0, 0.8]. As a conclusion, when t ∈ [0, 0.7], (A0)-(A1), (A2′),
(A3)-(A4) hold. By Theorem 2.4, Problem (PF) admits a set
of control laws which has asymptotic robust social optimality.
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper considered a class of mean field LQG social
optimum problem with global drift uncertainty. Based on
the soft control approach, a set of decentralized strategies
is designed by optimizing the worst-case cost subject to
consistent requirements in mean field approximations. Such
set of strategies is further shown to be robust social optimal
by perturbation analysis.
For further work, it is of interest to consider mean field team
optimization with volatility-uncertain common noise. Due to
common noise and volatility uncertainty, all states of agents
are coupled via some high-dimensional FBSDE systems. An-
other interesting topic is the mean field Stackelberg game with
a leader and many followers [34], [37]. The team problem with
hierarchical structure is worthwhile to study further.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2.4
Proof. Note that we only need to optimize the social cost
under worst-case disturbance Jwosoc(u). By Theorem 2.2, we
can restrict to consider Problem (P2) instead of (PF). From
Lemma 2.4, one obtains that for (P2),
E
∫ T
0
(‖xˆi‖2 + ‖uˆi‖2)dt < C. (A.1)
It suffices to consider all ui ∈ UFc such that Jwosoc(u) ≤
Jwosoc(uˆ) ≤ NC0. By Lemma 2.3,
E
∫ T
0
‖ui‖2dt < C, i = 1, · · · , N, (A.2)
which implies
E
∫ T
0
‖u(N)‖2dt < C. (A.3)
By (14) and [38, Chaper 7], we have
E
∫ T
0
‖s‖2dt ≤ C1E
∫ T
0
‖u(N)‖2dt < C.
From (13),
dx(N) =
[
(A+G¯)x(N)+Bu(N)−R−12 s
]
dt+
1
N
N∑
i=1
σdWi,
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which together with (A.3) implies E
∫ T
0
‖x(N)‖2dt< C. This
with (A.2) leads to
E
∫ T
0
(‖xi‖2 + ‖ui‖2 + ‖s‖2)dt < C. (A.4)
Let x˜i = xi − xˆi, u˜i = ui − uˆi, i = 1, · · · , N , x˜(N) =
1
N
∑N
j=1 x˜j and s˜ = s− sˆ. Then by (13),
dx˜i =(Ax˜i + G¯x˜
(N) +Bu˜i −R−12 s˜)dt, x˜i(0) = 0. (A.5)
ds˜ =− [(A+ G¯)T s˜+ PBu˜(N)]dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
β˜ji dWj , s˜(T ) = 0. (A.6)
By (A.1) and (A.4),
E
∫ T
0
(‖x˜i‖2 + ‖u˜i‖2 + ‖s˜‖2)dt < C. (A.7)
From (14), we have
JFsoc(u) =
1
2
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
[∥∥xˆi − Γxˆ(N) − η + x˜i
− Γx˜(N)∥∥2
Q
+
∥∥uˆi + u˜i∥∥2R1
− ∥∥P (xˆ(N) + x˜(N)) + sˆ+ s˜∥∥2
R−12
]
dt
+
1
2
E
∥∥xˆi(T ) + x˜i(T )∥∥2H
=
N∑
i=1
(JFi (uˆ) + J˜
F
i (u˜) + Ii),
(A.8)
where
J˜Fi (u˜)
∆
=
1
2
E
∫ T
0
[‖x˜i − Γx˜(N)‖2Q + ‖u˜i‖2R1
− ‖Px˜(N)‖2R2
]
dt+
1
2
E
∥∥x˜i(T )∥∥2H ,
Ii =E
∫ T
0
[(
xˆi − Γxˆ(N) − η
)T
Q
(
x˜i − Γx˜(N)
)
+ uˆTi R1u˜i −
(
P (xˆ(N) + sˆ)
)T
R−12 (Px˜
(N)
+ s˜)
]
dt+ E[xˆTi (T )Hx˜i(T )].
By Lemma 2.1, Problem (P2) is uniformly convex for N ≥
N0, which with Proposition 2.1 gives J˜i(u˜) ≥ 0. We now
prove 1N
∑N
i=1 Ii = O(
1√
N
). By straightforward computation,
N∑
i=1
Ii =
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
{
x˜Ti
[
Q(xˆi − Γxˆ(N) − η)
− ΓTQ((I − Γ)xˆ(N) − η)]+ uˆTi R1u˜i}dt
−NE
∫ T
0
(
Pxˆ(N) + sˆ
)T
R−12 (Px˜
(N) + s˜)dt
+
N∑
i=1
E[xˆTi (T )Hx˜i(T )]
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
{
x˜Ti (Qxˆi −Ψx¯− η) + uˆTi R1u˜i
− (Px¯+ sˆ)TR−12 Px˜i}dt
+
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
ξT
[
(Ψ−PR−12 P )x˜i−PR−12 s˜
]
dt
−NE
∫ T
0
(Px¯+ sˆ)TR−12 s˜dt+
N∑
i=1
E‖xˆTi (T )‖2H , (A.9)
where ξ = xˆ(N) − x¯. By (35) and (41),
dkˆi =
{−AT kˆi −Qxˆi + (Ψx¯+ η¯) + PR−12 (Px¯+ s¯)
−G¯T v+KG(xˆ(N) − x¯)−KR−12 (sˆ− s¯)
}
dt
+KσdWi, kˆi(T ) = Hxˆi(T ).
(A.10)
By (A.5) and Itoˆ’s formula,
N∑
i=1
E[xˆTi (T )Hx˜i(T )]
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
{
− [Qxˆi − (Ψx¯+ η¯)− PR−12 (Px¯+ s¯)
+ G¯T v −KG(xˆ(N) − x¯) +KR−12 (sˆ− s¯)
]T
x˜i
+ kˆTi (G¯x˜
(N) +Bu˜i −R−12 s˜)
}
dt,
and
0 =
N∑
i=1
E[lT (T )s˜(T )− lT (0)s˜(0)]
=NE
∫ T
0
[R−12 v +R
−1
2 (Px¯+ s¯)]
T s˜dt
−NE
∫ T
0
(lTPBu˜(N))dt.
The above two equations lead to
N∑
i=1
E[xˆTi (T )Hx˜i(T )]
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
{
− [Qxˆi − (Ψx¯+ η¯)− PR−12 (Px¯+ s¯)
−KG(xˆ(N) − x¯) +KR−12 (sˆ− s¯)
]T
x˜i
− uˆTi R1u˜i + (kˆ(N) − v)T G¯x˜i
− (kˆ(N) − v)R−12 s˜+ (Px¯+ s¯)TR−12 s˜
}
dt.
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From this and (A.9),
N∑
i=1
Ii =
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
[
ξT (Ψ− PR−12 P +KG)x˜i
+ (kˆ(N) − v)T (G¯x˜i −R−12 s˜)
+ ((P +K)x˜i + s˜)R
−1
2 (s¯− sˆ)
]
dt.
By Lemmas 2.2, 2.5 and Schwarz inequality, we obtain
1
N
N∑
i=1
Ii = O(
1√
N
).
From this with (A.8), the theorem follows. 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2
To prove Theorem 3.2, we need three lemmas.
Lemma B.1: Assume that (A0)-(A1), (A5)-(A8) hold. For
Problem (PI), we have
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(‖xˆ(N) − x¯‖2 + ‖sˆ− s¯‖2)dt = O( 1
N
). (B.1)
Proof. By a similar argument to (44)-(45), we obtain
dξ =(A¯+ G¯)ξdt−R−12 χdt+
1
N
N∑
i=1
σdWi,
ξ(0) = 1N
∑N
i=1 xi0 − x¯0,
dχ =− [(A+ G¯)Tχ+ PBR−11 BTKξ]dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(βji −
σ
N
)dWj ,
where ξ=xˆ(N) − x¯ and χ=sˆ− s¯. By Itoˆ’s formula and (A8),
we have χ = P˜ ξ + ψ, where P˜ is given by (69). Denote
Υ = A¯+ G¯−R−12 P˜ . Then
ξ(t) =eΥtξ(0) +
1
N
∫ t
0
eΥ(t−µ)
N∑
i=1
σdWi(µ).
This with (A8) gives E
∫∞
0
e−ρt‖ξ(t)‖2dt = O(1/N). 
Lemma B.2: Assume that (A0)-(A1), (A5)-(A8) hold. For
Problem (PI) and any N ,
max
1≤i≤N
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(‖xˆi‖2 + ‖uˆi‖2) dt <∞. (B.2)
Proof. By (A7) and Lemma B.1, we obtain that
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(‖xˆ(N)(t)‖2 + ‖sˆ(t)‖2)dt <∞.
Note that A¯− ρ2I is Hurwitz. By Schwarz’s inequality,
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖xˆi(t)‖2dt
≤ C+3E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρµ‖g(µ)‖2
∫ ∞
µ
t
∥∥e(A¯− ρ2 I)(t−µ)∥∥2dtdµ
+ 3CE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρµ‖σ(µ)‖2
∫ ∞
µ
∥∥e(A¯− ρ2 I)(t−µ)σ∥∥2dtdµ
≤ C + 3CE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρµ‖g(µ)‖2dµ
+ 3CE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρµ‖σ(µ)‖2dµ ≤ C1.
This with (A7) completes the proof. 
Lemma B.3: Assume A− ρ2I is Hurwitz. Then
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖kˆ(N) − v‖2dt ≤ O(1/N).
Proof. By (63) and some elementary computations, we obtain
dϑ(t) = −(A − ρ2I)Tϑ(t)dt, where ϑ = v − Kx¯ − ϕ. This
leads to ϑ(t) = e−(A−
ρ
2 I)tϑ(0). Since A− ρ2I is Hurwitz, and
ϑ ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn), then we have ϑ(t) ≡ 0, which implies
v = Kx¯ + ϕ. By Lemma B.1,
∫∞
0
e−ρtE‖kˆ(N) − v‖2dt ≤
O(1/N). This completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. As in the proof of Theorem 2.4, we
restrict to Problem (P2′). It suffices to consider all ui ∈ Uc
such that supf∈Uc Jsoc(u, f) ≤ supf∈Uc Jsoc(uˆ, f) ≤ NC0.
Taking f = 0, we have
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖ui‖2dt < C. (B.3)
By (54) and [29], we have
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖s‖2dt ≤ C1E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖u(N)‖2dt < C.
Noticing A + G¯ − ρ2I is Hurwitz, one can obtain
E
∫∞
0
e−ρt‖x(N)‖2dt < C which with (B.3) implies
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(‖xi‖2 + ‖ui‖2 + ‖s‖2)dt ≤ C. (B.4)
From this and (B.2),
E
∫ ∞
0
(‖x˜i‖2 + ‖u˜i‖2 + ‖s˜‖2)dt < C. (B.5)
We have Jsoc(u) =
∑N
i=1(Ji(uˆ) + J˜i(u˜) + Ii), where
J˜i(u˜)
∆
=
1
2
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[‖x˜i − Γx˜(N)‖2Q
+ ‖u˜i‖2R1 − ‖Px˜(N)‖2R2
]
dt,
Ii ∆= E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[(
xˆi − Γxˆ(N) − η
)T
Q
(
x˜i
− Γx˜(N))+ uˆTi R1u˜i
− (P (xˆ(N) + s))TR−12 (Px˜(N) + s˜)]dt.
From Lemma 3.1 and Proposition 3.1, J˜i(u˜) ≥ 0 for N ≥ N0.
By making use of Itoˆ’s formula and straightforward computa-
tions,
N∑
i=1
Ii =
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{
x˜Ti
[
Qxˆi −Ψx¯− η¯
]
+ uˆTi R1u˜i −
(
Px¯+ sˆ
)T
R−12 Px˜i
}
dt
+
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtξT [(Ψ− PR−12 P )x˜i − PR−12 s˜]dt
−NE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(Px¯+ sˆ)TR−12 s˜dt,
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
ξT (Ψ− PR−12 P +KG)x˜i
+ (kˆ(N) − v)T (G¯x˜i −R−12 s˜)
+ ((P +K)x˜i + s˜)R
−1
2 (s¯− sˆ)
]
dt.
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From (B.1) and (B.5), we obtain
1
N
N∑
i=1
Ii = O( 1√
N
).

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